REGULATION OF ACCOUNTANCY AND THE POWER OF CAPITAL: SOME OBSERVATIONS
Against a background of the increasing social and political power of the auditing industry, Briloff (2000) provides a timely study of financial reporting and auditing.
With enormous political, ideological and economic resources, the interests of capital dominate a large number of regulatory structures and institutions of government (Chomsky, 1989; Broder, 2000; Monbiot, 2000) . With the tightening grip of capital, the distinction between public authority and private power is becoming blurred (Barnet and Cavanagh, 1994) . The rhetoric of regulation obfuscates the power of big business. These themes are evident in Briloff's study. He finds that the data included in the COSO report is incomplete because it ignores many audit misdemeanours not specifically covered by the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). Briloff argues that many of these exclusions relate to the real/alleged audit failures and silence of major accountancy firms (Big Five/Six/Seven/Eight). These failures have negatively affected a variety of stakeholders and are routinely reported in the press but somehow do not carry the imprimatur of the agencies of the state and remain relatively invisible to researchers.
In capitalist societies, with emphasis on profit, all economic surpluses need to be accounted, allocated and distributed to the absent capitalists. In this context, accountants 'watch over capital', checking and controlling the processes associated with the enlargement of capital (Johnson, 1980) . The reward for serving capital has been a monopoly of the state guaranteed market of external auditing, a privilege that has enabled accountants to form major international businesses and become a major fraction of international capital. As the state is dependent upon the revenues generated by capitalist enterprises to enable it to deliver essential services (Offe, 1984) , there is an expectation that the it would seek to reassure the public that capitalism is not corrupt by taking regulatory action to discipline auditing firms implicated in audit failures. However, Briloff finds that the state has been indulging major accountancy firms and has been "oblivious to such critical questions as "Where were the auditors?" (Briloff, 2000, page 7) , even though the firms earn millions of dollars from the state guaranteed market of corporate audits. The penalties for malpractices, when sanctioned, have been relatively small and derisory and barely have a significant impact upon the multi-million income of major firms. Briloff's critique raises some questions about the 'capture' of the regulators and encourages reflections upon the relationship between large/international capital (major accountancy firms) and the state.
This paper seeks to do two things. Firstly, it briefly examines the UK institutional structures that are concerned with the regulation of financial reporting and auditing. This is relevant because the major accountancy firms identified in the Briloff paper also dominate the UK scene (Peel, 1997) . Following Briloff, the evidence advanced in this paper suggests that the UK regulatory structures are unwilling or unable to introduce effective sanctions against major firms (international capital). Secondly, the paper offers some observations upon the capture of the state by international capital.
SOME UK EVIDENCE
This section briefly examines the regulation of 'defective' annual accounts published by companies. It also reports that little effective action is taken against auditing firms implicated in audit failures and the publication of 'defective' company accounts.
Regulation and 'Defective' Accounts
The UK does not have anything equivalent to the Securities Exchange Commission (Dearing, 1988; Whittington, 1989; Turely, 1992) (Griffiths, 1986; Smith, 1992) especially in published financial statements carrying unqualified audit reports. Such episodes had a capacity to puncture the auditor's claims of independence and also undermine accounting's aura to construct an objective and independent account of corporate affairs. To manage the crisis of confidence, the FRRP's terms of reference require it to consider material departures from the reporting requirements of the Companies Acts by public and large private companies, notably material departures from accounting standards which pose the question whether in consequence the accounts fail to give a 'true and fair view'. The FRRP seeks to persuade directors to voluntarily revise the defective accounts but it is empowered to go the courts (Section 245B, the Companies Act 1985), if necessary, to secure compliance with its edicts.
Should the FRRP win its excursion to the courts 3 and the directors be ordered to issue revised accounts, then the entire cost would need to be met personally by the directors of the company.
The FRRP is charged with securing public confidence, but it keeps the public out of its meetings. Its files, minutes and agenda papers are not available for public scrutiny.
It operates in an exclusively passive and reactive mode by relying upon whistleblowers to inform it of 'defective' accounts (McBarnet and Whelan, 1999) .
Some 68% of the published accounts that are considered to be 'defective' are audited by the Big-five (Pope and Young, 2000) period of silence, the ICAEW was asked (7 September 1992) to explain the progress it had made in bringing possible disciplinary proceedings against auditors. The ICAEW replied by saying that "if a decision of that Committee [Investigation committee] results in an adverse disciplinary finding against a member or member-firm, that fact is reported publicly. No such report has or will be made in this case"(Letter from the ICAEW chief executive to Austin Mitchell MP, dated 1 October 1992).
Soon a pattern began to appear showing that whilst companies and their directors could be disciplined (e.g. threat of being taken to the courts, negative publicity) for issuing 'defective accounts', neither the state nor its agencies (e.g. the ICAEW) would take disciplinary action against firms implicated in the audit and issuance of 'defective' accounts. This was confirmed by the episode relating to the publication of 'defective' accounts by Trafalgar Plc. The company's accounts carried an unqualified audit report issued by Touche Ross (now part of Deloitte & Touche). The accounts were considered to be defective for their treatment of tax and reclassification of certain properties from current assets to fixed assets (FRRP press release, dated 15
October 1992). Despite the ritualistic reference to its Investigations Committee, the ICAEW did not take any disciplinary action against Touche Ross.
Following an extended period of inaction by the ICAEW, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was encouraged (letter from Austin Mitchell MP to the Minister for Corporate and Consumer Affairs, 5 March 1997) to consider whether the identification of 'defective' accounts in any way disciplined auditing firms, or even encouraged them to reflect upon the conduct of their audits. After consultation with the DTI, the Minister responded by providing a list (Table 1 ) of all the cases of 'defective' accounts carrying unqualified audit reports.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE Table 1 shows that the ICAEW claims to have been active in investigating the auditor involvement in the production of 'defective' accounts. However, there is no public evidence of the extent of the alleged 'investigation' which, if any, is always behind closed-doors. These investigations involve consultations with the accountancy firms, but there are no consultations with the stakeholders affected by the publication of unqualified audit reports attached to the 'defective' accounts. There is no public opportunity to examine the arguments put forward by auditors in their defence 6 . There is no opportunity to evaluate the quality and the extent of the investigations, if any.
Against the above background, the ICAEW exonerated all auditors listed in Table 1 .
The ICAEW position is that "When referrals are received by the Institute from the FRRP they are fully investigated with the roles of auditors (where regulated by the Institute) and Chartered Accountant members of the Board of Directors being closely scrutinised. In none of the cases considered by the Investigation Committee was it concluded that the auditors or any Chartered Accountant involved had acted in a way which merited disciplinary action. It follows that no reports of disciplinary proceedings have been published" (Letter from the ICAEW to Austin Mitchell MP, 18 July 1997).
Subsequent studies (Jupes, 1999 , Fearnley, 2000 have continued to note the ICAEW's unwillingness or inability to take disciplinary action against audit firms implicated in the production of 'defective' accounts. In 1999, under pressure from the DTI and the FRRP, the ICAEW finally took disciplinary action against three audit firms by fining them £1,500 7 , £1,000,and £500 8 respectively (Fearnley et al, 2000) , probably making the firm quake in their boots, all the way to the bank.
Regulation and Audit Failures
Some insight into the regulation of audit firms implicated in headline scandals and audit failures is provided by an earlier study of the 82 reports published by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) inspectors (Sikka and Willmott, 1995a) . The state has the capacity to form its own independent investigation unit. However, under the weight of neo-liberalist ideologies that resent public expenditure and independent scrutiny of capital, the UK state has failed to develop an independent unit to investigate major corporate scandals. Instead, the state relies upon the organisational structures of large law and accountancy firms to conduct its investigations. A team of inspectors (mostly an accountant from a major firm and a lawyer) usually prepares the reports. The investigations are usually facilitated by legislation (e.g. the Companies
Act 1985) and may cover the conduct of an audit.
The study (Sikka and Willmott, 1995a) focused upon the DTI inspectors' reports for the period 1971-1993, a period notable for an increasing emphasis in major accountancy firms "on being commercial and on performing a service for the customers rather than on being public spirited on behalf of either the public or the state" (Hanlon, 1994, p. 150) . The study noted that the reports relating to a large number of investigations (nearly half were not required to examine the conduct of Robert Maxwell had previously been described as a person "who cannot be relied upon to exercise proper stewardship of a publicly-quoted company" (Department of Trade and Industry, 1973 , 1972 , 1971 . Despite this, he became chairman of Mirror
Group of Newspapers (MGN) and Maxwell Corporate Communications (MCC) and
controlled more than 400 other companies (Bower, 1996; Davies, 1995) . In the regulatory maze operating in the UK, the accountancy trade associations (in their capacity as regulators) do not directly respond to public scandals. Instead, they wait for someone to formally complain and claim that they are dissatisfied with the audits. In the Maxwell case, that complaint came (12 February 1993) from the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation, a regulator of financial services.
Eventually, the ICAEW delegated the investigation of the Maxwell audits to the Joint Disciplinary Scheme (JDS); a self-regulating organisation originally created in 1979 in response to the previous audit failures (Sikka and Willmott, 1995b) . The JDS is financed and controlled by the UK accountancy trade associations. They decide the cases that are to be referred to it. The JDS meets behind closed-doors. There are no public hearings. The JDS Panels are made up of partners from other audit firms on the ground that only they have the particular knowledge to enable them to reach a Times, 3 February 1999, p. 21; Bower, 1999; Financial Times, 3 February 1999, p. 10; The Observer Business, 7 February 1999, p. 6; Daily Mail, 27 May 1999, p. 5) . Some parts of the Maxwell empire did not keep proper accounting records but auditors continued to issue unqualified audit reports. The firm and its partners admitted 57 errors of judgement 11 , including inadequate work, incompetent performance, undue acceptance of management representations, deficient consideration of the interest of third parties, deficient partner review and lack of robust implementation of a basically sound system of audit 12 (Chitty, 1999) .
Following its 'terms of reference', the JDS individualised the audit failures. Most of the blame was allocated to the Coopers & Lybrand audit partner Peter Walsh, who died (in 1996) whilst the JDS was making its inquiries. According to the JDS report, four Coopers & Lybrand partners failed to meet the required professional standards in auditing various parts of the Maxwell empire. The next senior partner against whom twenty complaints were listed, was censured and ordered to pay costs of £75,000 and fined a total of £35,000. The report says that he had never encountered fraud before and criticised him for too easily accepting management explanations 13 . Of the other three partners involved, two paid costs of £10,000 each and were admonished.
Another partner paid costs of £5,000.
In what is considered to be "the loudest tut-tut [the JDS] has ever emitted" (The Times, 3 February 1999, p. 16), Coopers & Lybrand were fined £1.2 million 14 (at around £2,000 per partner for its 600 UK partners) and also ordered it to pay the costs of £2.1 million. The financial penalties were described as "extraordinary in their triviality" (Daily Mail, 3 February 1999, p. 67), "not ….. much of a burden" (Financial Times, 3 February 1999, p. 23) and "a derisory flea bite upon a partnership whose greed and reckless judgements had, over twenty years, allowed Maxwell to build -for the third time -an empire based upon fraud" (Bower, 1999, p. 10) . Some urged the accountancy establishment to "make an example of those partners involved" (The Independent, 3 February 1999, p. 17) , but following the JDS report none of the partners have been disqualified from public practice and they continue to work for their firm 15 . No one has investigated the overall standards of the firm, or its successor firm (PricewaterhouseCoopers). The fines levied were not distributed to those affected by audit failures. Instead they were appropriated by the accountancy bodies, which in turn reduces their regulatory costs and the financial demands upon major firms to fund the regulatory structures 16 .
SOME OBSERVATIONS
Following Briloff, and against the background of increasing social and political power of major accountancy firms 17 (ICAEW, 2000, page 14) . However, the overwhelming evidence is that accountancy firms directly implicated in the production of 'defective' accounts rarely face any effective sanctions. They continue to be indulged and act as judges and juries for the FRRP.
On the auditing front, the continuing story is that despite the high profile investigations, little effective regulatory action is taken against international capital (major firms). The state has delegated the regulation of auditing to accountancy trade associations (e.g. the ICAEW) whose major function is to defend and advance the interests of international capital. They continue to campaign for wealth transfers to major firms (e.g. through auditor liability campaigns) by reducing the redress available to stakeholders against negligent auditors (Cousins et al, 1998 (Cousins et al, , 1999 . In any case, the accountancy trade associations (e.g. the ICAEW) do not have the financial and political independence to challenge international capital.
The issues about regulation of accounting are effectively issues about bringing international capital under democratic control. The present regulatory structures are captured by international capital and primarily function to advance its interests. An effective challenge to the power of international capital requires that it be engaged not on a single front (e.g. accountancy) but across a wide variety of fronts (Gramsci, 1971 ) so that the crisis of democracy can be deepened and given greater visibility. It requires fresh vocabularies and agendas and perspectives on theories of the state and society (Tinker, 1984; Sikka and Willmott, 1995a) , especially as the agencies of the state have developed procedures, processes and rationales that overlook or excuse the involvement of international capital in producing defective accounts and delivering poor audits, that are injurious to a variety of social constituencies. Such theories need to be alert to the way international capital has been able to forge close links with the officials of the state (e.g. providing lucrative consultancies to former and potential Ministers 18 ) and organise some issues off the political agenda (Monbiot, 2000) . The theories should also enable the development of alternative public policy perspectives.
In any engagement with international capital, organic intellectuals must engage in an extensive democratic dialogue with the 'common sense' understandings of the ordinary people, who are already socially positioned in a variety of contradictory ways. In this dialogue, the principles of democracy 19 , justice, human rights and fairness can be advanced as the 'fermenting agents' to challenge the power of capital.
A pressing question for 'critical' accounting is how to resist the power of international capital and take its critique of capitalism beyond the narrow confines of scholarly journals and academic conferences. Throughout his life, Briloff has shown that competing discourses can be taken beyond the academy through interaction with students, practitioners, policymakers, newspapers/magazines, evidence to congressional hearings and charged political pamphlets and speeches (Sikka, Willmott and Puxty, 1995) . Those dissatisfied with this form of praxis may call for the development of a comprehensive blueprint for an ideal and democratic society.
However, the possibilities of such blueprints are simultaneously constrained and enabled by the particularities of contemporary social theories. No blueprint could fully grasp all the intricacies and exclusions that are built into all contemporary societies. Neither could it fully anticipate the 'paradox of consequences' and the antidemocratic effects of apparently democratic strategies (Laclau, 1996) . Are our theories so rich that we can begin to imagine the antagonisms, rights and responsibilities of the subjects as yet unborn? With the expanding power of international capital, the challenge for 'critical' accounting is how to create and preserve the space for permanent democratic dissent, for it is only through this that social exclusions, power asymmetries, and exploitation can be exposed to keep alive the possibilities of democratic institutions and practices. 
